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On the evening of 30 June, Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith,
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, went to
bed at 9 o'clock in his quarters at Camp Wood near Kumamoto, Kyushu, tired and sleepy
after having been up all the previous night because of an alert. An hour and a half later
his wife awakened him, saying, "Colonel Stephens is on the phone and wants you."
At the telephone Smith heard Col. Richard W. Stephens, Commanding Officer, 21st Infantry,
say to him, "The lid has blown off-get on your clothes and report to the CP."
Thus began Task Force Smith as seen by its leader. Colonel Smith had been at Schofield
Barracks, Oahu, on 7 December 1941 when the Japanese hit Pearl Harbor, causing him
hurriedly to take D Company, 35th Infantry, to form a defense position on Barbers Point.
Now, this call in the night vividly reminded him of that earlier event.
At the regimental command post, Colonel Stephens told Smith
to take his battalion, less A and D Companies, to Itazuke Air Base; it was to fly to Korea
at once. General Dean would meet him at the airfield with further instructions. Colonel
Stephens quickly arranged to lend Smith officers from the 3d Battalion to fill gaps in the
rifle platoons of B and C Companies. By 0300 1 July Colonel Smith and his men were on
trucks and started on the seventy-five mile drive from Camp Wood to Itazake. They rode in
a downpour of rain, the same monsoon deluge that descended on General Church and his ADCOM
party that night on the road from Suwon to Taejon. Smith's motor convoy reached Itazake at
0805. General Dean was waiting for Smith at the airfield. "When you get to
Pusan," he said to him, "head for Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as
far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. Contact General
Church. If you can't locate him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can. Sorry I can't give
you more information. That's all I've got. Good luck to you, and God bless you and your
men."
Thus, the fortunes of war decreed that Colonel Smith, a
young infantry officer of the West Point Class of 1939 who had served with the 25th
Division in the Pacific in World War II, would command the first American ground troops
to meet the enemy in the Korean War. Smith was about
thirty-four years of age, of medium stature, and possessed a strong, compact body. His
face was friendly and open.
Assembled at Itazake, Colonel Smith's force consisted of
the following units and weapons of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment: 2
under-strength rifle companies, B and C; one-half of Headquarters Company; one-half of a
communications platoon; a composite 75-mm. recoilless rifle platoon of 4 guns, only 2 of
which were airlifted; and 4 4.2-inch mortars, only 2 airlifted. The organization of B and
C Companies included 6 2.36-inch bazooka teams and 4 60-mm. mortars. Each man had 120
rounds of .30-caliber rifle ammunition and 2 days of C rations. In all, there were about
440 men, of whom only 406 were destined to be in the group air-landed in Korea that day.
Smith's force had a liberal sprinkling of combat veterans from World War II. About
one-third of the officers had had combat experience either in Europe or in the Pacific.
About one-half of the noncommissioned officers were World War II veterans, but not all had
been in combat. Throughout the force, perhaps one man in six had had combat experience.
Most of the men were young, twenty years old or less.
Only six C-54 planes were available for the transport job.
The first plane was airborne at 0845. The first and second planes upon arrival over the
small runway near Pusan found it closed in with fog and, unable to land, they returned to
Japan. Colonel Smith was on the second plane but he could not land in Korea until the
tenth flight-between 1400 and 1500. Colonel Emmerich, who the previous afternoon had
received instructions to have the airstrip ready, a few other KMAG officers, and a great
number of South Korean civilians met the first elements when they landed about 1100.
A miscellaneous assortment of about a hundred Korean trucks
and vehicles assembled by Colonel Emmerich transported the men of Task Force Smith the
seventeen miles from the airstrip to the railroad station in Pusan. Cheering crowds lined
the streets and waved happily to the American soldiers as they passed. The city was in gay
spirits-flags, banners, streamers, and posters were everywhere. Korean bands at the
railroad station gave a noisy send-off as the loaded train pulled out at 2000.
The train with Task Force Smith aboard arrived at Taejon
the next morning, 0800 2 July. There Lt. Col. LeRoy Lutes, a member of ADCOM, met Colonel
Smith and took him to General Church's headquarters where the general was in conference
with several American and ROK officers. Church greeted Smith and, pointing to a place on
the map, explained, "We have a little action up here. All we need is some men up
there who won't run when they see tanks. We're going to move you up to support the ROKs
and give them moral support." Colonel Smith then suggested that he would like to go
forward and look over the ground. While his men went to their bivouac area, Smith and his
principal officers got into jeeps and set out over the eighty miles of bad, bumpy roads to
Osan. All along the way they saw thousands of ROK soldiers and refugees cluttering the
roads and moving south.
Three miles north of Osan, at a point where the road runs
through a low saddle, drops down, and bends slightly northwest toward Suwon, Smith found
an excellent infantry position which commanded both the highway and the railroad. An
irregular ridge of hills crossed the road at right angles, the highest point rising about
300 feet above the low ground which stretched northward toward Suwon. From this high point
both the highway and railroad were in view almost the entire distance to Suwon, eight
miles to the north. After looking over the ground, Smith issued verbal orders for
organizing a position there. A flight of enemy fighters, red stars plainly visible on
their wings, passed overhead, but their pilots apparently did not see the few men below.
Its purpose accomplished, the group returned to the Taejon airstrip well after dark.
That night, 2 July, Smith received an order to take his men
north by train to P'yongt'aek and Ansong. The former is 15 miles south, and the latter 20
miles southeast, of Osan. Smith loaded his men into trains and they rolled north into the
night. One company dug in at P'yongt'aek; the other at Ansong 12 miles away. Smith
established his command post with the group at P'yongt'aek on the main highway.
The next day at P'yongt'aek Colonel Smith and his men
witnessed a demonstration of aerial destructiveness. A northbound ammunition train of nine
boxcars on its way to ROK units pulled into P'yongt'aek. While the train waited for
further instructions, four Mustangs flown by Royal Australian Air Force pilots made six
strafing runs over it firing rockets and machine guns. The train was blown up, the station
demolished, and parts of the town shot up. All night ammunition kept exploding. Many
residents of P'yongt'aek died or were injured in this mistaken air strike.
That same afternoon friendly air also attacked Suwon and
strafed a South Korean truck column near the town. ROK rifle fire damaged one plane and
forced the pilot to land at Suwon Airfield. There, KMAG and ROK officers
"captured" a highly embarrassed American pilot. One KMAG officer with the ROK
Army headquarters at Suwon said he was under attack by friendly planes five different
times on 3 July. This same officer in a letter to a friend a few days later wrote of these
misplaced air attacks, "The fly boys really had a field day! They hit friendly ammo
dumps, gas dumps, the Suwon air strip, trains, motor columns, and KA [Korean Army]
Hq." In the afternoon, four friendly jet planes made strikes on Suwon and along the
Suwon-Osan highway setting fire to gasoline at the railroad station in Suwon and
destroying buildings and injuring civilians. On the road they strafed and burned thirty
South Korean trucks and killed 200 ROK soldiers. Because of these incidents throughout the
day, General Church sent a strong protest to FEAF asking that air action be held to Han
River bridges or northward.
American Ground Forces Enter The Battle
The next day, 4 July, Smith's divided command reunited at
P'yongt'aek, and was joined there by a part of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion. This
artillery contingent comprised one-half each of Headquarters and Service Batteries and all
of A Battery with 6 105-mm. howitzers, 73 vehicles, and 108 men under the command of Lt.
Col. Miller O. Perry. It had crossed from Japan on an LST 2 July, disembarking at Pusan
late that night. Two trains the next day carried the unit to Taejon. There General Church
ordered Perry to join Smith at P'yongt'aek, and about 2100 that night Perry's artillery
group entrained and departed northward. Because of the destroyed railroad station at
P'yongt'aek, the train stopped at Songhwan-ni, where the artillerymen unloaded and drove
on the six miles to P'yongt'aek before daylight.
Meanwhile, the 34th Infantry Regiment loaded at Sasebo
during the night of 1 July, and arrived at Pusan the next night. After Task Force Smith
had left Japan the rest of the 21st Infantry Regiment, except A and D Companies which
sailed from Moji, loaded at Sasebo 3 July and departed for Pusan, arriving there early the
next morning.
General Dean also was on his way to Korea. Failing on 2
July to land at Taejon because his pilot could not find the airstrip in the dark, General
Dean the next morning at Ashiya Air Base joined Capt. Ben L. Tufts on his way to Korea by
General Almond's order to act as liaison between Army and the press. Tufts' pilot knew the
Taejon airstrip and landed his plane there about 1030, 3 July. General Dean and Captain
Tufts went directly to the two-story yellow brick building serving as General Church's
ADCOM Headquarters.
That afternoon a message from General MacArthur notified
General Dean that United States Army Forces in Korea was activated under his command as of
0001 4 July. General Dean assumed command of USAFIK during the day and appointed General
Church as Deputy Commander. Twenty-two other officers were named General and Special Staff
officers of USAFIK ADCOM provided most of the officers for the USAFIK staff, but some KMAG
officers also served on it. Most of the KMAG officers who had left Korea by air on 27 June
returned aboard the ammunition ship Sergeant Keathley on 2 July. [15] By this time
the ROK Army had assembled and partly reorganized about 68,000 men.
Task Force Smith at Osan
Colonels Smith and Perry, and some others, went
forward in the late afternoon of 4 July to make a final reconnaissance of the Osan
position. At this time Perry selected the positions for his artillery. On the road ROK
engineer groups were preparing demolitions on all bridges.
Back at Taejon General Dean, a big six-footer with a
bristling crew cut cropping his sand-colored hair, and beanpole General Church, slightly
stooped, always calm seemingly to the point of indifference, discussed the probability of
imminent American combat with the enemy. The third general officer to come to the forward
area in Korea, Brig. Gen. George B. Barth, acting commanding general of the 24th Division
artillery, now arrived in Taejon in the early afternoon. General Dean decided to send
Barth forward to represent him, and with instructions for Task Force Smith. So, at 1500 4
July, General Barth started north by jeep for P'yongt'aek. ] When he found Smith, General
Barth relayed his orders to "take up those good positions near Osan you told General
Church about." A little after midnight the infantry and artillery of Task Force Smith
moved out of P'yongt'aek. Colonel Smith had to commandeer Korean trucks and miscellaneous
vehicles to mount his men. The native Korean drivers deserted when they found that the
vehicles were going north. American soldiers took over in the drivers' seats. General
Barth and Colonel Smith followed the task force northward. On the way, General Barth tried
to halt the ROK demolition preparations by telling the engineer groups that he planned to
use the bridges. At one bridge, after talk failed to influence the ROK engineers, Barth
threw the boxes of dynamite into the river. It was only twelve miles to Osan, but it took
two and a half hours to get there because ROK soldiers and civilians fleeing south filled
the road and driving was under blackout conditions.
]
About 0300 on 5 July, the delaying force reached the
position which Smith had previously selected. The infantry units started setting up
weapons and digging in at the pre-designated places. Colonel Perry moved his guns into the
positions behind the infantry that he had selected the previous afternoon. All units were
in place, but not completely dug in, before daylight.
In seeking the most favorable place to pass through the
ridge, the railroad bent eastward away from the highway until it was almost a mile
distant. There the railroad split into two single-track lines and passed over low ground
between hills of the ridge line. On his left flank Colonel Smith placed one platoon of B
Company on the high knob immediately west of the highway; east of the road were B
Company's other two rifle platoons. Beyond them eastward to the railroad tracks were two
platoons of C Company. This company's third platoon occupied a finger ridge running south,
forming a refused right flank along the west side of the railroad track. Just east of the
highway B Company emplaced one 75-mm. recoilless rifle; C Company emplaced the other
75-mm. recoilless rifle just west of the railroad. Colonel Smith placed the 4.2-inch
mortars on the reverse, or south, slope of the ridge about 400 yards behind the center of
B Company's position. The infantry line formed a 1-mile front, not counting the refused
right flank along the railroad track. [20] The highway, likely to be the critical axis of
enemy advance, passed through the shallow saddle at the infantry position and then
zigzagged gently downgrade northward around several knob-like spurs to low ground a little
more than a mile away. There it crossed to the east side of the railroad track and
continued on over semi-level ground to Suwon.
Two thousand yards behind the infantry, Colonel Perry
pulled four 105-mm. howitzers 150 yards to the left (west) off the highway over a small
trail that only jeeps could travel. Two jeeps in tandem pulled the guns into place. Near a
cluster of houses with rice paddies in front and low hills back of them, the men arranged
the guns in battery position. Perry emplaced the fifth howitzer as an antitank gun on the
west side of the road about halfway between the main battery position and the infantry.
From there it could place direct fire on the highway where it passed through the saddle
and the infantry positions.
Volunteers from the artillery Headquarters and Service
Batteries made up four .50-caliber machine gun and four 2.36-inch bazooka teams and joined
the infantry in their position. The infantry parked most of their miscellaneous trucks and
jeeps along the road just south of the saddle. The artillerymen left their trucks
concealed in yards and sheds and behind Korean houses along the road just north of Osan.
There were about 1,200 rounds of artillery ammunition at the battery position and in two
trucks parked inside a walled enclosure nearby. One or two truckloads more were in the
vehicles parked among the houses just north of Osan. Nearly all this ammunition was high
explosive (HE); only 6 rounds were high explosive antitank (HEAT), and all of it was taken
to the forward gun.
When the 52d Field Artillery was loading out at Sasebo,
Japan, the battalion ammunition officer drew all the HEAT ammunition available there-only
18 rounds. [23] He issued 6 rounds to A Battery, now on the point of engaging in the first
battle between American artillery and the Russian-built T34 tanks. At the Osan position as
rainy 5 July dawned were 540 Americans: 389 enlisted men and 17 officers among the
infantry and 125 enlisted men and 9 officers among the artillerymen. When first light
came, the infantry test-fired their weapons and the artillerymen registered their guns.
Then they ate their C ration breakfasts. In spite of the rain Smith could see almost to
Suwon. He first saw movement on the road in the distance near Suwon a little after 0700.
In about half an hour a tank column, now easily discernible, approached the waiting
Americans. In this first group there were eight tanks. About 0800 the men back in the
artillery position received a call from the forward observer with the infantry for a fire
mission. The sixth howitzer had been left at P'yongt'aek because of trouble with the prime
mover.
The official army records contain many inaccuracies with respect to Task Force Smith. To
note only a few: one FEC G-2 report gives the date of
the Osan action as 6 July, the 24th Division War Diary gives it as 4 July. Both are wrong.
Several sources state that enemy tank fire
destroyed all the American 105-mm. howitzers at Osan; only one was destroyed. Eversole
says he looked at his watch when the request for a fire mission came in from the forward
observer and noted the time as 0745, Barth thinks the time was closer to 0800. Smith told
the author he first saw the enemy column about 0700 and that it was about half an hour in
moving up in front of his position. In an interview with the 24th Division G-2 on 7 July
1950, two days after the action, Colonel Smith gave the time as 0745 when the tank column
approached his position. See 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 6-10 Jul 50, entry 64, 071720. A telephone
call from USAFIK headquarters in Taejon to GHQ in Tokyo at 1105, 5 July, gave the time of
initial contact as 0818. Memo,
Gen Wright, FEC C-3, for CofS ROK, 051130 Jul 50.
American Ground Forces Enter The Battle
At 0816 the first American artillery fire of the
Korean War hurtled through the air toward the North Korean tanks. The number two howitzer
fired the first two rounds, and the other pieces then joined in the firing. The artillery
took the tanks under fire at a range of approximately 4,000 yards, about 2,000 yards in
front of the American infantry. [26] The forward observer quickly adjusted the fire and
shells began landing among the tanks. But the watching infantrymen saw the tanks keep on
coming, undeterred by the exploding artillery shells.
To conserve ammunition Colonel Smith issued orders that the
75-mm. recoilless rifle covering the highway should withhold fire until the tanks closed
to 700 yards. The tanks stayed in column, displayed little caution, and did not leave the
road. The commander of the enemy tank column may have thought he had encountered only
another minor ROK delaying position.
General Barth had gone back to the artillery just before
the enemy came into view and did not know when he arrived there that an enemy force was
approaching. After receiving reports from the forward observer that the artillery fire was
ineffective against the tanks, he started back to alert the 1st Battalion of the 34th
Infantry, whose arrival he expected at P'yongt'aek during the night, against a probable
breakthrough of the enemy tanks.
When the enemy tank column approached within 700 yards of
the infantry position, the two recoilless rifles took it under fire. They scored direct
hits, but apparently did not damage the tanks which, firing their 85-mm. cannon and
7.62-mm. machine guns, rumbled on up the incline toward the saddle. When they were almost
abreast of the infantry position, the lead tanks came under 2.36-inch rocket launcher
fire. Operating a bazooka from the ditch along the east side of the road, 2d Lt. Ollie D.
Connor, fired twenty-two rockets at approximately fifteen yards' range against the rear of
the tanks where their armor was weakest. Whether they were effective is doubtful. The two
lead tanks, however, were stopped just through the pass when they came under direct fire
of the single 105-mm. howitzer using HEAT ammunition. Very likely these artillery shells
stopped the two tanks, although the barrage of close-range bazooka rockets may have
damaged their tracks.
The two damaged tanks pulled off to the side of the road,
clearing the way for those following. One of the two caught fire and burned. Two men
emerged from its turret with their hands up. A third jumped out with a burp gun in his
hands and fired directly into a machine gun position, killing the assistant gunner. This
unidentified machine gunner probably was the first American ground soldier killed in
action in Korea. American fire killed the three North Koreans.
Knowing the action was of historic importance, Barth looked
at his watch when the artillery opened fire. He says it was 0816.
The six rounds of HEAT ammunition at the forward gun were
soon expended, leaving only the HE shells which ricocheted off the tanks. The third tank
through the pass knocked out the forward gun and wounded one of its crew members.
The tanks did not stop to engage the infantry; they merely
fired on them as they came through. Following the first group of 8 tanks came others at
short intervals, usually in groups of 4. These, too, went unhesitatingly through the
infantry position and on down the road toward the artillery position. In all, there were
33 tanks in the column. The last passed through the infantry position by 0900, about an
hour after the lead tanks had reached the saddle. In this hour, tank fire had killed or
wounded approximately twenty men in Smith's position.
Earlier in the morning it was supposed to have been no more
than an academic question as to what would happen if tanks came through the infantry to
the artillery position. Someone in the artillery had raised this point to be answered by
the infantry, "Don't worry, they will never get back to you." One of the
artillerymen later expressed the prevailing opinion by saying, "Everyone thought the
enemy would turn around and go back when they found out who was fighting." Word now
came to the artillerymen from the forward observer that tanks were through the infantry
and to be ready for them.
The first tanks cut up the telephone wire strung along the
road from the artillery to the infantry and destroyed this communication. The radios were
wet and functioning badly; now only the jeep radio worked. Communication with the infantry
after 0900 was spotty at best, and, about 1100, it ceased altogether.
The tanks came on toward the artillery pieces, which kept
them under fire but could not stop them. About 500 yards from the battery, the tanks
stopped behind a little hill seeking protection from direct fire. Then, one at a time,
they came down the road with a rush, hatches closed, making a run to get past the battery
position. Some fired their 85-mm cannon, others only their machine guns. Their aim was
haphazard in most cases for the enemy tankers had not located the gun positions. Some of
the tank guns even pointed toward the opposite side of the road. Only one tank stopped
momentarily at the little trail where the howitzers had pulled off the main road as though
it meant to try to overrun the battery which its crew evidently had located. Fortunately,
however, it did not leave the road but instead, after a moment, continued on toward Osan.
The 105-mm. howitzers fired at ranges of 150-300 yards as the tanks went by, but the
shells only jarred the tanks and bounced off. Altogether, the tanks did not average more
than one round each in return fire.
Three bazooka teams from the artillery had posted
themselves near the road before the tanks appeared. When word came that the tanks were
through the infantry, two more bazooka teams, one led by Colonel Perry and the other by
Sgt. Edwin A. Eversole, started to move into position. The
first tank caught both Perry and Eversole in the rice paddy between the howitzers and the
highway. When Eversole's first bazooka round bounced off the turret of the tank, he said
that tank suddenly looked to him "as big as a battleship." This tank fired its
85-mm. cannon, cutting down a telephone pole which fell harmlessly over Eversole who had
flung himself down into a paddy drainage ditch. A 105-mm. shell hit the tracks of the
third tank and stopped it. The other tanks in this group went on through. The four
American howitzers remained undamaged.
After these tanks had passed out of sight, Colonel Perry
took an interpreter and worked his way up close to the immobilized enemy tank. Through the
interpreter, he called on the crew to come out and surrender. There was no response. Perry
then ordered the howitzers to destroy the tank. After three rounds had hit the tank, two
men jumped out of it and took cover in a culvert. Perry sent a squad forward and it killed
the two North Koreans.
During this little action, small arms fire hit Colonel
Perry in the right leg. Refusing to be evacuated, he hobbled around or sat against the
base of a tree orders and instructions in preparation for the appearance of more tanks.
In about ten minutes the second wave of tanks followed the
last of the first group. This time there were more-"a string of them," as one
man expressed it. They came in ones, twos, and threes, close together with no apparent
interval or organization.
When the second wave of tanks came into view, some of the
howitzer crew members started to "take off." As one present said, the men were
"shy about helping." The officers had to drag the ammunition up and load the
pieces themselves. The senior noncommissioned officers fired the pieces. The momentary
panic soon passed and, with the good example and strong leadership of Colonel Perry and
1st Lt. Dwain L. Scott before them, the men returned to their positions. Many of the
second group of tanks did not fire on the artillery at all. Again, the 105-mm. howitzers
could not stop the oncoming tanks. They did, however hit another in its tracks, disabling
it in front of the artillery position. [37] Some of the tanks had one or two infantrymen
on their decks. Artillery fire blew off or killed most of them; some lay limply dead as
the tanks went by; others slowly jolted off onto the road. [38] Enemy tank fire caused a
building to burn near the battery position and a nearby dump of about 300 rounds of
artillery shells began to explode. The last of the tanks passed the artillery position by
1015. These tanks were from the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored
Division, in support of the N.K. 4th Division.
Colonel Perry estimates that his four howitzers fired an
average of 4 to 6 rounds at each of the tanks, and that they averaged perhaps 1 round each
in return. After the last tank was out of sight, rumbling on toward Osan, the score stood
as follows: the forward 105-mm. howitzer, and 2.36-inch bazookas fired from the infantry
position, had knocked out and left burning 1 tank and damaged another so that it could not
move; the artillery had stopped 3 more in front of the battery position, while 3 others
though damaged had managed to limp out of range toward Osan. This made 4 tanks destroyed
or immobilized and 3 others slightly damaged but serviceable out of a total of 33.
For their part, the tanks had destroyed the forward 105-mm.
howitzer and wounded one of its crew members, had killed or wounded an estimated twenty
infantrymen, and had destroyed all the parked vehicles behind the infantry position. At
the main battery position the tanks had slightly damaged one of the four guns by a near
miss. Only Colonel Perry and another man were wounded at the battery position.
Task Force Smith was not able to use any antitank mines-one
of the most effective methods of defense against tanks-as there were none in Korea at the
time. Colonel Perry was of the opinion that a few well-placed antitank mines would have
stopped the entire armored column in the road.
After the last of the tank column had passed through the
infantry position and the artillery and tank fire back toward Osan had subsided, the
American positions became quiet again. There was no movement of any kind discernible on
the road ahead toward Suwon. But Smith knew that he must expect enemy infantry soon. In
the steady rain that continued throughout the morning, the men deepened their foxholes and
otherwise improved their positions.
Perhaps an hour after the enemy tank column had moved
through, Colonel Smith, from his observation post, saw movement on the road far away, near
Suwon. This slowly became discernible as a long column of trucks and foot soldiers. Smith
estimated the column to be about six miles long. It took an hour for the head of the
column to reach a point 1,000 yards in front of the American infantry. There were three
tanks in front, followed by a long line of trucks, and, behind these, several miles of
marching infantry. There could be no doubt about it, this was a major force of the North
Korean Army pushing south-the 16th and 18th Regiments of the N.K. 4th
Division, as learned later.
Whether the enemy column knew that American ground troops
had arrived in Korea and were present in the battle area is unknown. Later, Sr. Col. Lee
Hak Ku, in early July operations officer of the N.K. II Corps, said he had no idea
that the United States would intervene in the war, that nothing had been said about
possible U.S. intervention, and that he believed it came as a surprise to North Korean
authorities.
With battle against a greatly superior number of enemy
troops only a matter of minutes away, the apprehensions of the American infantry watching
the approaching procession can well be imagined. General MacArthur later referred to his
commitment of a handful of American ground troops as "that arrogant display of
strength" which he hoped would fool the enemy into thinking that a much larger force
was at hand.
When the convoy of enemy trucks was about 1,000 yards away,
Colonel Smith, to use his own words, "threw the book at them." Mortar shells
landed among the trucks and .50-caliber machine gun bullets swept the column. Trucks burst
into flames. Men were blown into the air; others sprang from their vehicles and jumped
into ditches alongside the road. The three tanks moved to within 200-300 yards of the
American positions and began raking the ridge line with cannon and machine gun fire.
Behind the burning vehicles an estimated 1,000 enemy infantry detrucked and started to
deploy. Behind them other truckloads of infantry stopped and waited. It was now about
1145.
The enemy infantry began moving up the finger ridge along
the east side of the road. There, some of them set up a base of fire while others fanned
out to either side in a double enveloping movement. The American fire broke up all efforts
of the enemy infantry to advance frontally. Strange though it was, the North Koreans made
no strong effort to attack the flanks; they seemed bent on getting around rather than
closing on them. Within an hour, about 1230, the enemy appeared in force on the high hill
to the west of the highway overlooking and dominating the knob on that side held by a
platoon of B Company. Smith, observing this, withdrew the platoon to the east side of the
road. Maj. Floyd Martin, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, meanwhile supervised the
carrying of available ammunition stocks to a central and protected area back of the
battalion command post. The 4.2-inch mortars were moved up closer, and otherwise the men
achieved a tighter defense perimeter on the highest ground east of the road. In the
exchange of fire that went on an increasing amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire fell
on the American position. Enemy machine guns on hills overlooking the right flank now also
began firing on Smith's men.
Earlier, Colonel Perry had twice sent wire parties to
repair the communications wire between the artillery and the infantry, but both had
returned saying they had been fired upon. At 1300 Perry sent a third group led by his
Assistant S-3. This time he ordered the men to put in a new line across the paddies east
of the road and to avoid the area where
the earlier parties said they had received fire.
About 1430, Colonel Smith decided that if any of his
command was to get out, the time to move was at hand. Large numbers of the enemy were now
on both flanks and moving toward his rear; a huge enemy reserve waited in front of him
along the road stretching back toward Suwon; and his small arms ammunition was nearly
gone. A large enemy tank force was already in his rear. He had no communications, not even
with Colonel Perry's artillery a mile behind him, and he could hope for no reinforcements.
Perry's artillery had fired on the enemy infantry as long as the fire direction
communication functioned properly, but this too had failed soon after the infantry fight
began. The weather prevented friendly air from arriving at the scene. Had it been present
it could have worked havoc with the enemy-clogged road.
Smith planned to withdraw his men by leapfrogging units off
the ridge, each jump of the withdrawal covered by protecting fire of the next unit ahead.
The selected route of withdrawal was toward Osan down the finger ridge on the right flank,
just west of the railroad track. First off the hill was C Company, followed by the medics,
then battalion headquarters, and, finally, B Company, except its 2d Platoon which never
received the withdrawal order. A platoon messenger returned from the company command post
and reported to 2d Lt. Carl F. Bernard that there was no one at the command post and that
the platoon was the only group left in position. After confirming this report Bernard
tried to withdraw his men. At the time of the withdrawal the men carried only small arms
and each averaged two or three clips of ammunition. They abandoned all crew-served
weapons-recoilless rifles, mortars, and machine guns. They had no alternative but to leave
behind all the dead and about twenty-five to thirty wounded litter cases. A medical
sergeant, whose name unfortunately has not been determined, voluntarily remained with the
latter. The slightly wounded moved out with the main units, but when enemy fire dispersed
some of the groups many of the wounded dropped behind and were seen no more.
Task Force Smith suffered its heaviest casualties in the
withdrawal. Some of the enemy machine gun fire was at close quarters. The captain and
pitcher of the regimental baseball team, 1st Lt. Raymond "Bodie" Adams, used his
pitching arm to win the greatest victory of his career when he threw a grenade forty yards
into an enemy machine gun position, destroying the gun and killing the crew. This
particular gun had caused heavy casualties.
About the time B Company, the initial covering unit, was
ready to withdraw, Colonel Smith left the hill, slanted off to the railroad track and
followed it south to a point opposite the artillery position. From there he struck off
west through the rice paddies to find Colonel Perry and tell him the infantry was leaving.
While crossing the rice paddies Smith met Perry's wire party and together they hurried to
Perry's artillery battery. Smith had assumed that the enemy tanks had destroyed all the
artillery pieces and had made casualties of most of the men. His surprise was complete
when he found that all the guns at this battery position were operable and that only
Colonel Perry and another man were wounded. Enemy infantry had not yet appeared at the
artillery position.
Upon receiving Smith's order to withdraw, the artillerymen
immediately made ready to go. They removed the sights and breech locks from the guns and
carried them and the aiming circles to their vehicles. Smith, Perry, and the artillerymen
walked back to the outskirts of Osan where they found the artillery trucks as they had
left them, only a few being slightly damaged by tank and machine gun fire.
Perry and Smith planned to take a road at the south edge of
Osan to Ansong, assuming that the enemy tanks had gone down the main road toward
P'yongt'aek. Rounding a bend in the road near the southern edge of the town, but short of
the Ansong road, Smith and Perry in the lead vehicle came suddenly upon three enemy tanks
halted just ahead of them. Some or all of the tank crew members were standing about
smoking cigarettes. The little column of vehicles turned around quickly, and, without a
shot being fired, drove back to the north edge of Osan. There they turned into a small
dirt road that led eastward, hoping that it would get them to Ansong.
The column soon came upon groups of infantry from Smith's
battalion struggling over the hills and through the rice paddies. Some of the men had
taken off their shoes in the rice paddies, others were without head covering of any kind,
while some had their shirts off. The trucks stopped and waited while several of these
groups came up and climbed on them. About 100 infantrymen joined the artillery group in
this way. Then the vehicles continued on unmolested, arriving at Ansong after dark.
There was no pursuit. The North Korean infantry occupied
the vacated positions, and busied themselves in gathering trophies, apparently content to
have driven off the enemy force.
The next morning, 6 July, Colonel Smith and his party went
on to Ch'onan. Upon arrival there a count revealed that he had 185 men. Subsequently,
Capt. Richard Dashmer, C Company commander, came in with 65 men, increasing the total to
250. There were about 150 men killed, wounded, or missing from Colonel Smith's infantry
force when he took a second count later in the day. The greatest loss was in B Company.
Survivors straggled in to American lines at P'yongt'aek, Ch'onan, Taejon, and other points
in southern Korea during the next several days. Lieutenant Bernard and twelve men of the
reserve platoon of B Company reached Ch'onan two days after the Osan fight. Five times he
and his men had encountered North Korean roadblocks. They arrived at Ch'onan only half an
hour ahead of the enemy. A few men walked all the way from Osan to the Yellow Sea and the
Sea of Japan. One man eventually arrived at Pusan on a Korean sampan from the west coast.
None of the 5 officers and 10 enlisted men of the artillery
forward observer, liaison, machine gun, and bazooka group with the infantry ever came
back. On 7 July 5 officers and 26 enlisted men from the artillery were still missing.
The N.K. 4th Division and attached units apparently
lost approximately 42 killed and 85 wounded at Osan on 5 July. A diary taken
from a dead North Korean soldier some days later carried this entry about Osan: "5
Jul 50 . . . we met vehicles and American PWs.
We also saw some American dead. We found 4 of our destroyed tanks. Near Osan there
was a great battle."
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